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Ronald J. Berger
University of Wisconsin-Whitewater
Cherylynne E. Berger
Crossroads Counseling Center
ABSTRACT
This paper examines juvenile delinquency preven-
tion programs which implement large-scale intervention
and social change strategies. A typology of community
organization practice is used to analyze the assump-
tions, objectives, and methods underlying these ap-
proaches. Three models of community organization--
locality development, social planning, and social
action--are used to evaluate three exemplary delin-
quency prevention programs: the Chicago Area Project,
the 1960's provision of opportunity programs, and the
1960's comprehensive community-based projects such as
Mobilization for Youth. The difficulties encountered
in implementing these models and programs are identi-
fied and assessed. The implications for contemporary
crime prevention efforts are also considered.
Juvenile delinquency prevention encompasses a wide
range of practices, and there is little consensus on
what the term "prevention" means (Wright and Dixon,
1977). In general, three preventative orientations
can be identified: primary prevention, secondary
prevention, and tertiary prevention. Primary preven-
tion attempts to keep delinquent behavior from arising
in the first place; it involves strategies directed at
the entire community and not just at individuals who
are "the casualties seeking treatment" (Klein and
Goldston, 1977:vii). Secondary prevention focuses on
*We would like to thank Neil Cohen and James Winship
for their helpful comments and suggestions.
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early diagnoses and treatment of vulnerable children,
and tertiary prevention aims to avoid recidivist be-
havior after delinquent acts have already occurred.
Some observers argue that it would be preferable to
limit the use of the term prevention to primary pre-
vention, while rehabilitation would be a more appro-
priate label for secondary and tertiary prevention
(Klein and Goldston, 1977; Gilbert, 1982).
The purpose of this paper is to critically
examine approaches to delinquency prevention that
embody the notion of primary prevention. These
efforts involve large-scale intervention and social
change strategies which attempt to provide oppor-
tunities to disadvantaged youth, develop community
resources, implement institutional reform, and or-
ganize and mobilize target-area residents for col-
lective action [1]. A typology of community organiza-
tion practice, as developed by Jack Rothman (1979a;
Cox et al., 1979), will be used to analyze the assump-
tions, objectives, and methods underlying programs of
this nature. While there is controversy as to whether
there exists a coherent body of community organization
theory (Schwartz, 1977), there are clearly delineated
models of community organization practice. In this
paper, three models of community organization--local-
ity development, social planning, and social action--
will be used to evaluate three exemplary delinquency
prevention programs: the Chicago Area Project, the
1960's provision of opportunity programs, and the
1960's comprehensive community-based projects such as
Mobilization for Youth. These programs span a range
of local and federal efforts which emphasized altera-
tion or modification of the environmental, community,
and institutional conditions which were believed to
cause delinquency. By examining the general princi-
ples underlying these strategies, our analysis avoids
simply re-hashing them as episodes in the development
of delinquency theory. Rather, they become significant
as attempts to operationalize theory through particular
organizational mechanisms.
After outlining the assumptions underlying the
three models of community organization practice and
evaluating the delinquency prevention programs, we
will also consider their implications for contemporary
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efforts at crime prevention. In contrast to earlier
approaches, these efforts aim to change the behavior
of potential victims rather than potential offenders
(Lewis and Salem, 1981). However, many of the as-
sumptions underlying victim-oriented crime prevention
are rooted in earlier offender-oriented programs.
Thus, it is imperative that future prevention efforts
of all kinds take into account the advantages and
limitations of past practices.
MODELS OF COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION PRACTICE
Community organization is defined as "inter-
vention at the community level oriented towards
improving or changing community institutions and
solving community problems" (Cox et al., 1979:3).
For analytic purposes, Rothman (1979a) delineates
three different models of community organization
practice: locality development, social planning, and
social action [2]. Each of these has its own assump-
tions, utilities, and limitations. Locality develop-
ment and social planning more readily lend themselves
to a consensus view of society and the maintenance of
social stability. Social action is oriented toward a
conflict view of society and the promotion of institu-
tional social change. However, these approaches need
not be applied in a mutually exclusive manner and can
be either mixed or phased in their application to
specific community problems.
According to Rothman, the central assumption of
locality development is that community change is best
brought about by enlisting the broadest range of
people at the local level to collectively identify
needs, goals, and solutions to problems. The basic
themes include "democratic procedures, voluntary co-
operation, self-help, development of indigenous
leadership, and educational objectives" (Rothman,
1979a:27). Process goals are accorded the highest
priority; that is, the primary goal is to establish
cooperative working relationships and widespread
interest and participation in community affairs.
Consensus tactics are used by the community organizer
to bring various interest groups, social classes, and
ethnic groups together to identify their common con-
cerns. It is assumed that these groups have interests
that are basically reconcilable and amenable to
rational problem-solving. However, it is the process
of bringing the community together, rather than the
accomplishment of particular tasks, that is central
to locality development.
In social planning emphasis is placed on the
design and application of controlled rational change
by "experts" who possess highly technical skills and
specialized knowledge. The emphasis is on task
goals, that is, the completion of a specified task
related to the solution of a tangible problem.
Community members are viewed as customers or benefi-
ciaries of services and are not involved in the
planning or delivery process. Social change tends to
be gradual, maintenance-oriented, removed from poli-
tics, and regulated and controlled by professionals
who are not themselves members of the client popula-
tion. The organizer often acts as a mediator between
conflicting interests and attempts to tone down more
radical demands.
Finally, in the social action approach the
community organizer seeks to mobilize the economical-
ly and politically disadvantaged members of the
community to make effective demands for the redistri-
bution of resources and alteration of institutional
policies. This approach may involve both task and
process goals. Conflict tactics are frequently
engaged in as the organizer aims to build a large
consitituency, capable of obtaining and utilizing
power to promote their own interests. Dominant
political and economic groups and institutions are
often the targets of change and considered to be part
of the community's problems. The organizer is a
partisan and advocate of the disenfranchised and not
a mediator of conflicting community interests.
As ideal types, locality development, social
planning, and social action identify the basic as-
sumptions underlying various large-scale delinquency
prevention programs. In the following sections we
will use these community organization models to
evaluate the Chicago Area Project, the programs for
the provision of opportunities, and the comprehensive
community-based projects. While these prevention
programs were not necessarily pure applications of
any single model of community organization practice,
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each contained different emphases which can be illumi-
nated by applying community organization concepts.
THE CHICAGO AREA PROJECT
The Chicago Area Project (CAP), begun in the
early 1930's, is considered to be the classic illus-
tration of locality development as applied to de-
linquency prevention (Mech, 1975). The underlying
philosophy was that only through the mobilization and
active participation of the entire community was it
possible to impact significantly upon the problem of
delinquency (Spergel, 1969; Dixon and Wright, 1974).
The project was rooted in the work of Clifford Shaw
(1942) who examined the ecological distribution of
delinquency and found urban slums to be populated by
a disproportionate number of delinquent youths.
Unlike the anomie-opportunity theory which formed the
basis of later programs, Shaw did not consider blocked
opportunities or institutional inequality to be the
central problem. Rather, he saw the problem as lying
in social disorganization and the failure of the
adult community to exert informal social controls
over its youth.
Self-help and democratic procedures were major
themes of the CAP. Project staff workers functioned
in an advisory role, but decisions about policies and
programs were made by community members, independent
of the approval or disapproval of the project staff.
The task for community organizers was to convince
local residents to assume responsibility for the pre-
vention of delinquency, to help them exercise more
influence over their children, and to facilitate
cooperation and joint problem-solving among the
residents, the churches, the schools, the courts, the
police, and other significant community groups. The
focus was on building community cohesion and pride,
and on developing residents' confidence in their
ability to effect change (Empey, 1982; Schlossman and
Sedlak, 1983).
The CAP engaged people in a variety of activities
intended to achieve its goals. The development of
recreational facilities and the creation of clubs,
hobby groups, and rap groups were central features.
The CAP pioneered the use of detached workers to
provide curbstone counseling for juveniles and iden-
tify indigenous gang leaders who might be encouraged
to adopt the legitimate community's values. Efforts
to intercede in matters relating to the schools and
juvenile justice system forshadowed more contemporary
efforts at child advocacy and diversion. Finally,
the project attempted to assist incarcerated juve-
niles in preparing for return to the community (Empey,
1982; Schlossman and Sedlak, 1983).
The CAP applied the model of locality development
in a purist fashion and utilized consensus tactics.
The accomodative spirit was illustrated by the com-
munity's willingness to accept responsibility for the
city's delapidated physical appearance and its deci-
sion not to indict the city's service departments.
On the other hand, the assumption of consensus and
cooperative problem-solving which predicated locality
development was often lacking. It was difficult to
find common ground between local residents and repre-
sentatives of the business community, schools,
churches, and the criminal justice system. For
instance, attempts to enlist the help of the business
community in expanding the employment opportunities
for delinquent youths were not always successful.
The project was also criticized for its heavy reli-
ance on the voluntary services of the Polish Catholic
Church which was accused of using the recreational
programs to proselytize potential converts. Programs
in some neighborhoods were criticized for interfering
with those sponsored by other groups. Even the
professional staff of organizers was sometimes annoyed
and upset about its loss of control over the project,
suggesting a preference for a social planning approach
to community organizing (Schlossman and Sedlak, 1983).
One of the strongest criticisms was levied by
Saul Alinsky, the project's most aggressive detached
worker. Although the CAP attempted to increase
community empowerment by training indigenous leader-
ship and intervening in institutional affairs, Alinsky
argued that it was inadequate to achieve significant
economic change. He advocated confrontational tactics
indicative of a social action approach to community
organizing in order to force more fundamental polit-
ical and economic concessions from the power struc-
ture. Alinsky's frustration undoubtedly derived from
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a basic dilemma of locality development strategies--
how to sustain community interest following mobiliza-
tion when process goals are given priority over task
goals (Schlossman and Sedlak, 1983).
In spite of these problems, Shaw believed that
the project was successful in reducing delinquency in
the community (Schlossman and Sedlak, 1983). Though
this reduction was difficult to measure, Kobrin (1959)
argues that the case for the CAP ultimately rests on
logical and analytic grounds. Shaw was mainly inter-
ested in demonstrating the possibility of operation-
alizing his analysis of social problems through par-
ticular organizational mechanisms. He believed that:
(1) delinquency was symptomatic of underlying social
processes; (2) simply responding on a one-to-one basis
with individual youths was ineffective; and (3) the
entire community must and could be organized effec-
tively to solve its own problems.
THE 1960'S PROVISION OF OPPORTUNITY PROGRAMS
Many observers view the delinquency prevention
programs of the 1960's as direct descendants of the
CAP (Freeman et al., 1979; Empey, 1982; Ohlin, 1983).
However, there are significant differences which can
be highlighted by applying Rothman's community organi-
zation typology. The various programs associated
with the 1960's period and the "War on Poverty" were
predicated on the anomie theory of Robert Merton
(1938) and its application to deliquency by Richard
Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin (1960). Essentially, the
theory postulated that delinquent behavior develops
because of a discrepancy between the aspirations of
disadvantaged youth for culturally approved goals
(i.e., success, money, material goods) and their
opportunities to achieve these goals through legiti-
mate channels (i.e., education, employment). In
general, the prescribed remedy involved significant
improvement in the economic and educational opportu-
nities of low-income and minority youth.
The 1960's programs were comprised of two major
orientations--the "provision of opportunity" programs
and the "comprehensive community-based" projects.
The former utilized a social planning model of com-
munity organization, while the latter employed a
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social action model mixed with locality development
and social planning. Because the provision of opportu-
nity programs relied on a single model, we will
discuss them first and consider the comprehensive
community-based projects in the following section.
The provision of opportunity programs attempted
to increase low-income and minority youths' access to
socially-approved means of obtaining success. The
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 authorized the
Department of Labor to become involved in delinquency
prevention through the Neighborhood Youth Corps and
the Job Corps. The Neighborhood Youth Corps included
an in-school program to provide jobs and training on
a part-time basis to youths who were enrolled, a
summer work program for students who needed summer
jobs to remain in school, and an out-of-school pro-
gram for youths who were both unemployed and unen-
rolled in school. The Job Corps differed in that it
was designed to take low-income urban youths out of
their delinquency-prone environment and place them in
residential centers for job-training. These residen-
tial centers were frequently located in rural areas
where residents were taught forest conservation
skills (Griffen and Griffen, 1978). This was a
serious planning error which obviously ignored the
training needs of urban youth who would be returning
to the city to search for employment. In addition,
both the Job Corps and the Neighborhood Youth Corps
merely offered job training without guaranteeing
employment upon completion of training. The validity
of preparing youths for jobs which did not exist was
another planning error.
During the same decade, the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare and the Department of Housing
and Urban Development developed a broad range of
delinquency prevention programs. For instance, HEW's
Upward Bound program was directed towards producing
positive changes in motivation and skill to facili-
tate the educational achievement of disadvantaged
youth. Similarly, HUD's Model Cities programs pro-
vided youth in deteriorated urban areas with college
scholarships, job placements, college prep programs,
and health career projects. They also included
direct social services such as counseling, drug abuse
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treatment, help for unwed mothers, recreation, and
teen clubs (Griffen and Griffen, 1978).
The provision of opportunity programs were the
outcome of a straight-forward social planning ap-
proach. Professional planners with specialized
skills and knowledge designed a program of controlled
rational change to solve the delinquency problem.
The planners, working for the government, created
programs which were considered to be in the public
interest, but the recipients of these services had
minimal or no role in the determination of program
policy or goals. Community workers tended to operate
as agents of the state, helping to regulate the poor
and phase out social action oriented projects and
confrontational tactics (see Piven and Cloward,
1971).
Rooted in liberal ideology, the social planning
approach to providing opportunities sought only to
establish conditions of equal opportunity for indi-
viduals to compete for society's economic rewards.
While these programs did help to secure a fragile
black middle class, equality of result has not been
achieved for the intransigent underclass which con-
tributes disproportionately to the serious crime and
delinquency problem in urban areas (Wilson, 1978).
Lacking a concern with community involvement, self-
help, and use of indigenous community resources and
leadership, the social planning model lent itself to
an expensive, bureaucratic welfare apparatus which
administered "prevention" to clients but which cre-
ated as much "opportunity" for social welfare profes-
sionals as it did for the target population.
As was the case with the CAP, the provision of
opportunity strategies were never subjected to sys-
tematic program evaluation to determine their effec-
tiveness on reducing delinquency. Rather than reach-
ing hard-core delinquent or delinquent-prone youth,
the programs may have only helped those who were more
motivated and upwardly mobile to begin with (Spergel,
1969; Grosser, 1976). Thus, neo-conservative critics
(e.g., Wilson, 1975) have pointed to the rise in
crime rates which occurred during this period and
suggested that the provision of opportunity programs
were based on a naive liberal optimism and a blind
"throwing money" approach to solving social problems.
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We will have more to say about the limitations of
these programs after discussing the social action
component of the 1960's efforts. It suffices here to
say that anomie-opportunity theory in its original
form no longer guides delinquency prevention strat-
egies in the United States.
COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION
Like the provision of opportunity programs, the
1960's comprehensive community-based prevention (CCBP)
projects attempted to prevent delinquency through
modification or alteration of social conditions. How-
ever, promoters of CCBP attempted to utilize and inte-
grate all three models of community organization:
locality development, social planning, and social
action.
The CCBP programs began in the early 1960's
through the auspices of the President's Committee on
Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime and continued
under the Office of Economic Opportunity. They were
large-scale, multi-dimensional social welfare programs
established under federal control, funded with govern-
ment money, and rooted in the local neighborhood.
The projects focused on increasing the ability of
communities to develop the requisite services and
conditions which would enable youths to participate
in and have influence upon community affairs (Grosser,
1976; Freeman et al., 1979).
The comprehensive community-based projects placed
a great deal of emphasis on locality development stra-
tegies of community organization. As in the CAP,
adults and juveniles were involved in autonomous, com-
munity-controlled organizations. Adults were included
to help reduce community apathy and provide evidence
to young people that residents could effectively exer-
cise control over their own affairs. In 1964, a
demonstration review panel summed up the basic assump-
tion:
The panel is unanimous in its opinion that
major involvement on the part of community
residents to improve their own situation
is the sine qua non of a successful compre-
hensive program to combat delinquency in
disadvantaged and demoralized communities
(Grosser, 1976:24).
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One year later, Title II of the Economic Opportunity
Act translated this recommendation into a mandate for
"maximum feasible participation." This mandate
generated much controversy and criticism when coupled
with the social action components of these projects
(Moynihan, 1969).
Mobilization for Youth (MFY) is viewed as the
blueprint for comprehensive community-based delin-
quency prevention programs (Empey, 1982). MFY uti-
lized a combination of the three community organi-
zation strategies to achieve a broad range of objec-
tives, including: (1) the improvement of educational
opportunities through teacher training, the develop-
ment of relevant curriculum and teaching methods,
increased parent-school contacts, and pre-school
programs; (2) the creation of job opportunities
through work subsidies, vocational training, and
career guidance; (3) the organization of the low-
income community through the formation of neighbor-
hood councils and the mobilization of residents for
social action; (4) the provision of specialized
services to youth through detached gang workers,
recreation activities, and rap groups; and (5) the
provision of specialized services to families through
Neighborhood Service Centers which offered child
care, counseling, and assistance in applying for
public social services (Empey, 1982).
Inspired by MFY, the President's Committee
sponsored additional legislation and invited other
communities to submit proposals and demonstrate how
they would set up a comprehensive, large-scale program
aimed at achieving institutional and social change.
The federal government offered funding and assistance
in planning, but the communities had to utilize their
own resources and involve residents of the target
area in the planning and implementation (Empey,
1982). Some of the better known of these demonstra-
tion projects included: Houston Action for Youth,
Harlem Youth Unlimited-Associated Community Teams,
and the United Planning Organization in Washington,
D.C. The central features shared by these diverse
projects were: (1) the development and promotion of
community involvement and self-help capabilities;
(2) the organization of formal structures for indige-
nous leadership and decision-making, such as neighbor-
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hood councils, policy boards, and committees; (3) the
maintenance of local autonomy; (4) the increased
responsiveness of social institutions to the needs of
the target population; and (5) the involvement of
both youths and adults in social action activities
designed to redress specific grievances in the areas
of housing, health care, and discrimination in employ-
ment (Mech, 1975; Grosser, 1976).
The social action component of these projects
generated a great deal of criticism, debate, and
withdrawal of support. In MFY, for instance, the
residents were encouraged to participate in strikes,
protests, and confrontations with public institu-
tions. The intended goal was to make political
leaders aware that the community was an organized
interest group to which they must respond. Frequently,
the community's grievances concerned the same insti-
tutions (e.g., schools, welfare, juvenile justice
system) that the prevention program attempted to
bring together in a cooperative alliance. The con-
sequence was that local, federal, and private sponsors
became the targets of social action strategies
(Grosser, 1976). It was a classic case of "biting the
hand that feeds you," a dilemma created by attempting
to mix the consensus tactics of locality development
with the confrontational tactics of social action.
This built-in contradiction pitted the goals of
political leaders and funding agencies against com-
munity organizers and local residents. Whereas the
politicians and funding agencies desired to achieve
community stability by getting youths involved in
legitimate activities, the community attempted to
challenge the power structure and change the political
process which distributed inequitable institutional
opportunities in the first place. By the mid 1960's,
MFY was overrun by accusations of communist sympathies
and misuse of government funds, and organizers who
favored social action were eventually purged (Krisberg,
1975).
Other CCBP projects experienced similar diffi-
culties. Local interest groups and institutions such
as landlords, police, school officials, and the news
media, mounted counter-offensive propaganda which
encouraged curtailment of funds. The escalating
Vietnam military budget also reduced funds, and
remaining program resources had to be devoted to
organizational survival rather than the original
social change objectives. Confrontational tactics
and innovative programs were toned down or altered to
conform to a social planning model of social service
delivery that was more attractive to funding sponsors.
Many were transformed into predominately counseling
and treatment programs (Burkhardt, 1973).
Some observers question whether there was ever
full political support for the radical changes implied
by opportunity theory and CCBP (Marris and Rein,
1973). Many community agencies did not believe that
such large-scale changes could be justified merely to
prevent delinquency (Ohlin, 1983). Bureaucratic
funding policies, administrative demands, and a
preoccupation with accountability, efficiency, and
cost-benefit analysis took precedence over innovation
and experimentation. Many projects were only granted
short-term funding with no commitment for continued,
long-term support. Evaluation efforts to assess the
impact of programs were unimpressive (Grosser, 1976;
Braithwaite, 1979). It was difficult to demonstrate
that the interventions of a specific program with
particular methods brought about specific changes in
individuals. It was not possible to designate control
and experimental groups since services were not
selectively provided. And the explicit focus on
delinquency tended to get lost in the escalation of
the larger "War on Poverty."
The various approaches which were implemented in
the 1960's appear to have failed to bring about the
anticipated social changes and reductions in delin-
quency. Ohlin (1983) argues that programs prolifer-
ated too rapidly and exceeded the talent and knowledge
available to achieve tangible results. Wilson (1975)
believes that "It was the failure to appreciate the
importance of community and gravity of the threats to
it that lead to some mistaken views during the 1960's
of the true nature of the 'urban crisis'" (1975:24).
While Ohlin's observations are correct, Wilson's
criticisms ignore the explicit focus on community
which was at the root of CCBP. In contrast, a more
reasonable critique of the programs' apparent failure
would emphasize: (1) the lack of full political
support and counter-offensive efforts waged by vested
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interest groups; (2) bureaucratic funding policies,
administrative concerns, and competition for scarce
resources; (3) the provisions for job training with-
out a concomitant effort to increase the supply of
available jobs; and (4) the contradictions inherent
in attempts to mix the social action and locality
development models of community organization. Pub-
licly funded projects which organize people for
social action can expect to have great difficulties
in establishing and perpetuating their autonomy and
original objectives. Priority will inevitably be
given to reformers working for change through a
social planning model rather than those who organize
people to pressure for change from the outside.
IMPLICATIONS FOR VICTIM PREVENTION
A recent shift in prevention strategies has been
toward community crime prevention for victims [3].
Like earlier offender-oriented prevention programs,
these efforts aim to increase the capacity of the com-
munity to respond collectively to social problems
(Lewis and Salem, 1981). Boostrom and Henderson (1983)
classify these victim-oriented approaches as: (1) mo-
bilization of the community to increase the effective-
ness of individual security; and (2) crime prevention
through environmental design. The individual security
strategy includes technological improvements (e.g.,
locks, alarms), property-marking, neighborhood watch,
block clubs, citizen patrols, whistlestop programs,
self-defense training, and use of citizen-band radios.
Environmental design involves urban planning and
architectural modifications to create a "defensible
space" where like-minded residents share a common
territory, public areas are highly visible, paths of
movement are clearly delineated, and particular areas
are designated for legitimate users and activities
and delegitimated for others (Newman, 1972). Both
the individual security and environmental design
models are clearly based on one or more of the methods
of community organization discussed in this paper.
The individual security strategy is indicative
of a locality development approach to community
organization insofar as it attempts to mobilize
residents to take responsibility for crime control in
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their neighborhood. However, political officials and
law enforcement agencies have preferred a social plan-
ning emphasis. Though citizen involvement has been
favored as a way to reduce reliance on expensive,
bureaucratic methods of crime control, police desire
to maintain their role as experts who possess the
skills and knowledge necessary to "define the nature
of the problem, gather the information necessary to
implement the.. .preventative measures, and also over-
see, supervise, and regulate" the community's activi-
ties (Boostrom and Henderson, 1983:26). The conflict
between the locality development and social planning
components of community crime prevention is illus-
trated by police opposition to autonomous, citizen-
initiated attempts such as the Guardian Angels
(Michalowski, 1983). Thus, the police are likely to
support only those prevention programs which allow
them to direct citizens' activities. This social
planning orientation becomes especially problematic
when police-directed victim prevention strategies are
biased in favor of the middle class communities and
consequently reinforce existing neighborhood patterns
of victimization (Batten, 1984).
Boostrom and Henderson see environmental design
as more capable of maintaining a commitment to the
citizen autonomy characteristic of locality develop-
ment. This strategy requires the skills of urban
planners and architects, not police officers. It,
therefore, contains no inherent mandate for expanded
police resources or control. The themes of self-help
and self-reliance are stressed over the surrender of
"responsibilities to any formal authority" (Newman,
1972:14). Residents are encouraged to "reinforce
their norms of behavior, develop a stake in protecting
their spaces (and) dictate what is going to be allowed
as legitimate activity within these spaces" (Boostrom
and Henderson, 1983:27).
The locality development emphasis in victim-
oriented crime prevention, as in offender-oriented
delinquency prevention, is not without its inherent
contradictions and dilemmas. On the one hand, local-
ity development is predicated on a consensus approach
to solving problems whereby different interest groups
come together to identify common concerns and objec-
tives. On the other hand, community crime prevention
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may become a means by which middle class residents
attempt to defend the purity of their neighborhoods
and prevent "undesirables" and "outsiders" from using
their streets. Surveys indicate that residents are
as much concerned about various "incivilities" (e.g.,
teenagers hanging around, illegal drug use) as they
are about more serious violent crimes and thefts
(Lewis and Maxfield, 1980). While wealthy communities
can afford private security patrols, middle class
residents have been forced to rely on public police
to keep their streets clean. It is possible that
middle class neighborhoods are beginning to adopt
strategies of self-policing similar to vigilante peer
groups and delinquent gangs which have long "defended"
lower class communities (see Suttles, 1972). Thus,
community crime prevention has the potential to
create territorial conflicts between diverse classes
and races which are attempting to establish the
boundaries of their neighborhoods in urban areas
(Boostrom and Henderson, 1983).
At the same time, recent evaluations of victim
prevention programs indicate that residents continue
to view social service and neighborhood improvements
as effective crime prevention strategies. People are
more likely to get involved in crime prevention when
it is connected to broader community goals and pre-
existing voluntary community organizations (Podolefsky
and DuBow, 1980; Lavrakas and Herz, 1982). These
findings suggest that the public would be receptive
to strategies which integrate offender-oriented and
victim-oriented approaches to prevention. This
integration becomes even more important given that
victim prevention efforts alone have not been partic-
ularly successful at reducing crime (Murray, 1983).
In fact, these programs have tended to emphasize the
reduction of fear of crime rather than crime itself
(Murray, 1983). Thus, the current trend in victim
prevention, as indicated by recent projects funded by
the National Institute of Justice, appears to be
toward fear reduction rather than a return to
offender-oriented primary prevention strategies
(e.g., Lavrakas, 1984). Such an approach has obvious
limitations for those residents who live in neighbor-
hoods where the fear of crime is a realistic assess-
ment of reality.
144
CONCLUSION
Large-scale approaches to the prevention of
juvenile delinquency began with the 1930's Chicago
Area Project and emerged full bloom in the 1960's
provision of opportunity programs and comprehensive
community-based projects. All of these strategies
shared a view of delinquency as symptomatic of under-
lying social conditions which could not be prevented
or remedied by responding to individuals on a one-to-
one basis. However, the programs applied the models
of community organization practice in different ways.
The CAP pioneered the use of locality development in
delinquency prevention, along with specific innova-
tions such as recreation, detached workers, child
advocacy, school liaisons, and diversion. The social
planning model employed in the provision of opportu-
nity programs has left its legacy on current efforts
at economic and job assistance, equal opportunity
programs, and affirmative action. And the social
action emphasis of CCBP projects has now been trans-
muted in the form of increased citizen involvement in
grass-roots, neighborhood organizations (Rothman,
1979b).
Future efforts to implement primary delinquency
prevention strategies must avoid replicating the
problems encountered in earlier programs and avoid
"1merely trying to win back liberal ground lost to
neoconservative policy makers" (Michalowski, 1983:13).
However, in a period of high unemployment, slow
economic growth, and declining state resources, it is
not clear whether the constraints placed on community
organization strategies can be overcome. The often
praised emphasis on process goals in locality develop-
ment has serious pitfalls. Expectations may be
raised without providing concrete gains. This may
lead to increased anger, frustration, apathy, and
sense of relative deprivation. Local organizing
efforts are ineffectual if they are not linked to
legislation and policy at higher governmental levels.
However, the experience of the Job Corps and Neighbor-
hood Youth Corps demonstrates that social planning to
equip youths with job skills is futile if the economy
has no room for them. Similarly, social action and
confrontation with public institutions to demand
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better services are useless if legislators are endors-
ing massive cut-backs. Thus, any strategy which
ignores the need for economic policies leading to
full employment and income redistribution can expect
to fail [4]. Jobs will need to be attractive enough
to provide viable alternatives to crime and motivate
individuals to undertake adequate training. These
policies would undoubtedly require community organiza-
tion for social action to create pressure for change,
but these actions in themselves could lead to short-
term reductions in delinquency, as the experience of
communities in protest have shown [5].
While governmental policies aimed at economic
reconstruction are needed, the principle of local
control that was the central feature of the compre-
hensive community-based projects should be maintained.
Residents need to be involved in the planning and
implementation process. This would minimize the
sense of alienation which people often experience
when services are "dispensed" to them by social
welfare professionals. People must have a sense that
the program "belongs" to them and that they are
capable of succeeding on their own given a fair
chance (Walker, 1984).
An additional way to promote both community
involvement and prevention goals would be to create
community-controlled neighborhood mediation com-
mittees. Under the guidance of neighborhood panels,
residents could be encouraged to publicly express and
resolve their conflicts with one another before these
conflicts become crimes. In order to further greater
self-reliance on the part of the community members,
these efforts at conflict resolution should remain
independent of formal ties to the criminal justice
system (Shonholtz, 1984).
Offender-oriented strategies would also be more
effective if they contained a victim-oriented compo-
nent. Community mobilization for victim prevention
would reduce the need for an expensive, bureaucratic
law enforcement apparatus and make funds available
for neighborhood improvements and social services.
Youth's involvement in practices such as protective
community patrols might help reduce their alienation
and divert their interest from destructive community
behaviors (Michalowski, 1983), especially if they
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were also recipients of services provided to them.
Programs to assist juvenile victims of crimes would
also reinforce conventional standards of behavior
(Alcabes and Jones, 1980).
A major caveat of such a comprehensive approach
to delinquency prevention is the difficulty of design-
ing a method of quantitative program evaluation.
Klein and Goldston (1977) argue that primary preven-
tion strategies should not be expected "to prove that
an individual who did not become the victim of a
condition would without question have incurred the
condition except for the preventive intervention"
(1977:vii). Spergel (1969), on the other hand,
believes that primary prevention programs can be
evaluated through the designation of experimental and
control groups. However, such a design would offset
the premise of a comprehensive community-based project
--that the entire community be involved and that the
provisions of the program be multi-faceted. Moreover,
the goal of a primary prevention program should be
the improvement of the quality of life in the community
in general and not merely the reduction of delinquency.
Bureaucratic funding policies which require short-term
demonstrations of delinquency reduction need to be
re-evaluated if primary prevention is to receive
continued, long-term support. Primary prevention
strategies cannot be expected to produce instantaneous
results because the social, economic, and political
patterns which underlie the delinquency problem are
deeply ingrained.
We suspect that our society does not have a
genuine commitment to the widespread social changes
required for an effective primary prevention approach
to delinquency. Preference will inevitably be given
to secondary and tertiary prevention strategies that
are more limited in scope and more accurately char-
acterized as rehabilitative, rather than preventative,
in nature (Klein and Goldston, 1977; Gilbert, 1982).
Although the "diversion" movement of the 1970's
brought promise of increased emphasis on such prac-
tices as advocacy, service brokerage, resource devel-
opment, and agency coordination, professionals working
within community-based agencies such as Youth Service
Bureaus tend to prefer a counseling and treatment
approach to the delinquency problem (Selke, 1982).
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Similarly, applications of deterrence theory which
attempt to "scare" juveniles into conformity are also
not preventative in that these interventions occur
after the problem has already arisen (Finckenauer,
1982) 16].
In spite of the difficulties which confront
primary delinquency prevention strategies, our eval-
uation of past practices indicates that it is possi-
ble to design and implement a program and mobilize
the entire community to address the delinquency
problem. Typically, however, assessments o- previous
successes and failures are made in terms of the
"scientific adequacy" of the particular theory which
formed the basis of the program (see Empey, 1982),
rather than the organizational mechanisms through
which these theories were implemented. But while the
popularity of various theories may change [7], the
organizational principles underlying their applica-
tion to large-scale prevention will continue to be
predicated on the community organization models we
have discussed in this paper. The current debate
over the future direction of delinquency prevention
should not be limited to considerations of theoretical
adequacy. Greater attention should also be given to
the potentialities and limitations inherent in uti-
lizing the locality development, social planning, and
social action models of community organization.
NOTES
1. This paper will not address other forms of delin-
quency prevention (e.g., recreation, detached workers,
community-based treatment), except as they relate to
or are included within large-scale programs.
2. Spergel (1969) approaches community organization
practice with a similar typology. He identifies
four community organization strategies: development,
maintenance, contest, and conflict. Essentially,
development is the same as Rothman's locality devel-
opment, maintenance is similar to social planning,
and contest and conflict are aspects of social
action. Spergel also identifies four corresponding
practitioner roles: developer, enabler, advocate,
and organizer.
3. It is interesting that the entire meaning of
"opportunity" theory has now been transformed from a
concern with the offender (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960)
to a concern with the victim or crime target (Cohen
et al., 1981). Rather than attempting to provide
opportunities for youths, these strategies are
oriented toward reducing opportunities to success-
fully carry out criminal acts.
4. More will be required than simply a "War on
Poverty." Conyers (1979) argues that criminologists
have ignbred economic problems and that a policy of
full employment should be central to any crime
prevention agenda. Chester (1977) recommends pro-
gressive taxation aimed at income redistribution to
reduce the gap between rich and poor. Michalowski
(1983) suggests that publicly run nonprofit corpora-
tions could be established, along with increased
taxation on corporate profits and restrictions on
plant closures.
5. In a study of a Chicano community during the
late 1960's and early 1970's, community members
reported that gang activity subsided when the com-
munity was mobilized in protest activities (Erlanger,
1979).
6. Like the large-scale prevention programs, neither
the treatment nor deterrence approaches have had
much success in demonstrating reductions in delin-
quency (Dixon and Wright, 1974; Mech, 1975;
Finckenauer, 1982).
7. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention currently favors control theory (see
Hirschi, 1969) as the most promising theoretical
approach to delinquency (Federal Register, 1980).
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